

## The Battle over the Street

The U.S.–Israeli imperial power, frustrated after half a century of covert and proxy schemes, has finally removed its mask, and through its aggression against Iran’s domain has made its intention loudly clear: safeguarding U.S.–Israeli interests cannot be achieved through Iran’s national cohesion and territorial unity; the partition of Iran is the solution it seeks. The latest strategy of the U.S.–Israeli alliance for the ethnic and geographic fragmentation of Iran is the overthrow of its popular system through the capture of the “street.” For this purpose, in 2026–2025 three stages of a plot to seize the “street” were carried out by the alliance. On 13 June it was believed that, following the continuation of the military assault, people would pour into the “street” and the system would collapse. The attack was carried out, but people did not come into the streets. Instead, national unity and love of homeland growing stronger in their hearts rendered even the continuation of military confrontation futile for the aggressors. Thus, they requested a ceasefire until another plot could be arranged. On 8 January the plan changed, since in the previous phase the external force had produced national unity. Therefore, internal agents were recruited to carry out indiscriminate assassinations at selected points in the form of guerrilla groups, hoping that people dissatisfied with rising prices caused by the government’s currency policies would join them, seize the “street,” and thereby prepare the ground for the overthrow of the system. With Reza Pahlavi’s call, the terror groups drew society into turmoil. Their strategy was to move out of the virtual sphere and assert their presence in the real world by seizing the “street.” They hoped that the spark created by these groups would bring dissatisfied people into the “street,” creating favorable conditions for foreign military intervention so that the system could be encircled from two sides and overthrown. In practice, however, a little more than a day after terror had dominated the street, law enforcement forces entered the scene. The confrontation between the two sides although it resulted in heavy casualties among both sides and among innocent civilians prevented the seizure of the “street,” and the pretext for the entry of foreign forces did not materialize. In the third step, the analysis of the U.S.–Israeli adversary remained centered on the capture of the “street.” They assumed that in the previous phase, the military suppression of the terror groups had prevented the plan from being completed. Therefore, this time they placed a limited military action at the starting point, so that the stage of terror and unrest would begin in the power vacuum that followed. On 28 February, the Ramadan War began with a U.S.–Israeli attack. In the first strike, the Leader of the Revolution and a number of senior military commanders were killed. However, the subsequent links in the chain of the U.S.–Israeli plan did not unfold as they had anticipated. Iran’s military forces quickly entered a defensive and gradually offensive confrontation, and the nation supporting the system rapidly took control of the “street.” The continuous presence of the people in the streets created an epic scene. It not only prevented the terror groups from playing a role, but also fostered renewed spirit, a sense of unity, and the strengthening of the nation’s warrior ethos. At this point, the country’s officials having realized the practical significance of the “street” insisted continuously on the sustained presence of the nation in the “street.” Very quickly, the policy of preserving the “street” for the preservation of the system became the main strategy of the Ramadan War. “You hold the street, and we will hold the battlefield” (Majid Mousavi, IRGC commander, 2026/03/03). “Presence and participation [in the street] are considered a communal obligation” (Ayatollah Sistani, 2026/03/07). “This small soldier of yours has three requests: the street, the street, the street” (Ghalibaf, 2026/03/11). “Effective presence on the scene must be maintained, whether in the form you have shown during these days and nights of war, or through various forms of meaningful participation in different arenas” (Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, 2026/03/12). “I swear that the reward for people’s presence in the streets is far greater than that of worship during the pre dawn hours of Ramadan” (Ayatollah Marvi, 2026/03/17). The formation of a religious and social discourse in support of the status of the street and its importance in the fate of society was the outcome of the U.S.–Israeli conspiracies in the years 2026–2025. The emergence of unprecedented events in the space of the street confirms its great capacity in shaping and determining the fate of the community. If the Qur’an, according to the testimony of the verse “Indeed, God does not change the condition of a people until they change what is within themselves” (Surah al Ra’d, verse 11), considers the destiny of society to be the result of the condition of its individuals, then naturally the “position” in which individuals grow is regarded as a strategic matter. Here, the role of the “street” as the “place” of human practical experience in interaction with the community becomes unique. This very role is sufficient for the street so that managers and planners no longer regard it merely as a means of passage, but rather view it as the “place” where the hidden forces within society emerge, and so that, during planning, design, construction, and management, they remain aware that the object of their work is the most important organ of the city and a school for the making of human beings and the building of society. Just as the street was the shore of salvation for society in confronting the U.S.–Israeli assault, it is also an unparalleled opportunity in the phase of building the country. May it be recognized.

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