

What do we have in common in the landscape?

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Abstract | History shows that 'landscape', a particular version of cosmophany (the appearance of the world proper to a certain being), for a long time has been the privilege of an elite. In the present world, it has become a notion common to a good part of Humankind. A philosopher like Giorgio Agamben qualifies it as "a phenomenon which concerns Man in an essential way", and goes as far as to suppose that it stretches out to the animal kingdom. One tries here to set a few historical and ontological bench marks in this popular soup.

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For whom is there "landscape"?

The last edition of the *Petit Larousse* (2019) gives "landscape" the four following definitions: "1. Extent of land that offers itself to view: panorama. 2. Such an extension, characterized by its appearance: Desert landscape. 3. Representation of a natural or urban site by painting, drawing, photography, etc. 4. Fig. Overall aspect of such field, such sphere of activity: Political landscape, audiovisual (...)". The first edition (1906), for its part, gave the following: "Scope of country that presents an overview: admire the landscape. Drawing, painting representing a country site: Corot has left beautiful landscapes.

We see that between 1906 and 2019, while the first meaning remained the same or approximately ("country" becomes "land", "Extent" becomes "Extended" ...), substantial changes have occurred for the rest. The landscape is no longer just "rural", it is today "natural or urban"; and most importantly, the term has acquired figurative meanings that it did not have before. For this double, and especially the second, it has become widespread. The landscape is more talked about than in the past, and in more diverse cases. In other words, the noun "landscape" is a more common name than a century ago.

Given this, this phenomenon goes beyond the lexicographic domain. This means that a change has occurred in the relationship between society and its territory, that is to say, in its spatiality, and even in what makes it on the Earth. In some respects, and to a certain extent, which it is up to us to examine, this report, here called "landscape", is no longer what it was in

Cezanne's time (contemporary of the first edition of the *Petit Larousse*). What was it then? Let's see what the person said (if we believe his historiographer, Joachim Gasquet):

"With peasants, hold on, I sometimes doubted that they know what a landscape, a tree, yes. It seems odd to you. I went for walks sometimes, I accompanied a farmer behind his cart who was going to sell his potatoes at the market. He had never seen Sainte-Victoire. They know what is sown, here, there, along the road, how long it will be tomorrow, if Sainte-Victoire has his hat or not, they smell like animals, like a dog knows what is that a piece of bread, according to their only needs, but that the trees are green, and that this green is a tree, that this land is red and that these fallen reds are hills, I do not believe that the most feel it, they know it, outside their utilitarian unconscious" (Gasquet, 1921/2002, 282-283).

What Cezanne tells us here is that the peasants of his time did not see Sainte-Victoire as a landscape. Certainly, not being more blind than Cezanne, they saw it too, but as something else. As what? That Cezanne does not tell us, and besides, the look of the hicks, it does not interest him: it is "the way of animals, like a dog", and what it can see is not worth not define it. The peasants of Cezanne's time, they have "never seen Sainte-Victoire" in a qualifiable way; point.

We, on the other hand, have today to describe it, that look which, in the days of Cézanne and the first *Petit Larousse*, was certainly that of most people: one in two Frenchmen was then working in the fields, not to mention those who worked at the factory. Neither peasants nor workers would have understood anything at the sign of the A7 freeway which now, around Aix-en-Provence, enjoins us to see there the "landscapes of Cézanne". What are, "the landscapes of Cézanne"?

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But were these people really content with "sniffing (...) the only needs (...) of their utilitarian unconscious"? The human sciences and even ethology have since passed through, and today they lead one of our most prominent philosophers to write the following:

"[Contemplate the situation of the country from the top of a mountain], passion that ethologists were surprised to find in the animal kingdom, where we see goats, felines and primates climb the high places to contemplate, without reason apparent, the surrounding landscape (Fehling, 1974, 44-48). (...) Whoever has observed the petrified, hallucinated landscapes painted on the walls of the Campanian villas, which Michel Rostovtzeff called idillyco-sacrés (sakral-idyllisch), knows that he is faced with something extremely difficult to understand, but he certainly recognizes landscapes."

The landscape is therefore a phenomenon that concerns man in an essential way - and perhaps the living as such - (...) (Agamben, 2017/ 2019, 81)".

But who is this "anybody", who "certainly recognizes landscapes" in the Pompeian frescoes, and even in the eyes of goats, felines and primates? And since when does it exist?

Since when is there "landscape"?

A first problem arises about this "anyone" is that he could not recognize "landscapes" before the Renaissance, since previously, the word did not exist in the main European languages. To limit oneself to French (I will not go so far as to mix with Corsican lexicography), the Robert, Historical Dictionary of the French Language (1998 edition), teaches us that this word, derived from a country, appears for the first time written in 1549, as a "painting term designating the representation of a site usually country, then the painting itself" (Rey, 1995). That seems to exclude goats, at least at first glance. But does this exclude people before the Renaissance, and especially the Romans, who painted the frescoes of Pompeii?

Agamben, like many others, assures us that no:

"It has often been said that the first appearance of landscape sensitivity was in the letter in which Petrarch describes his ascent of Mount Ventoux sola *videndi insignem loci altitudinem cupiditate ductus* (moved by the sole desire to see the altitude of the place). In the same sense, it has been argued that landscape painting, which was known in antiquity, would be an invention of the Dutch painters of the fifteenth century. These two statements are false. Not only is the place and date of the composition of the letter probably fictitious, but the quote from Augustine introduced by Petrarch (X, 8, 15) to stigmatize his *cupiditas videndi* implies that men of the fourth century already liked to contemplate the landscape: and having *homines mirari alta montium and ingentes fluctuantes husbandas and latissimos lapsus fluminum* (and men go to admire the summit of the mountains, the enormous waves of the sea and the vast course of the rivers). But many passages testify to a real passion among the Ancients for contemplation from the heights: *magnum capies voluptatem* - written Pliny, Letters, V, 6, 13 - *si hunc regionis situm ex monte prospexeris* (you will have great pleasure to contemplate the situation of the country from the top of a mountain) (...). As for painting, not only the Pompeian frescoes, but also the sources show

that the Romans knew landscape painting, which they called *topiographia* or "scenography" (*skenographia*), and we have kept the name of landscape painters like Ludius, *who primus instituit amoenissimam parietum picturam* and Serapion, who knew how to paint scenographies of landscapes, but not the human figure (*hic scaenas optime pinxit, sed hominem pingere non potuit* (ibid, 80-81))".

Of which act; but is it enough to affirm that the Romans - and especially of humanity in general - had all the same as us, aware of the landscape? For my part, I maintain that such a thing, "the landscape," has not always and everywhere existed; therefore, that this thing was born at a certain moment in history and in a certain culture² (Berque, 2008/ 2017, 49). Why speak of "birth" rather than, for example, invention of the landscape? Because I do not like this constructivist vocabulary, which leads us to think that the landscape is a pure creation of the human eye. The landscape is not in a look at objects, it is in the reality of things, that is to say in the existential relationship we have with our environment, so with the Earth, Sol III, the planet that we wear and behave. This will be specified later. Here I will only invoke Plato, who in the *Timaeus* calls genesis (birth) the reality of the sensible world (*kosmos aisthetos*) where we are immersed. This fits well with the reality of the landscape, a reality that is actually born at a certain point in history.

But how to date such a thing? Not to mention those for whom the landscape has always and everywhere existed, disagreements are great about its appearance; especially as to whether the Romans had or did not have this notion. These disagreements are often dialogues of the deaf, for want of objective witnesses making it possible to compare between them, without ethnocentrism and without anachronism, different realities.

It had to go out. For this I first adopted four, then five, and then seven criteria, without which I do not think I can speak well of a landscape about this or that culture. These are the following, in order of increasing discrimination:

1. Toponymy testifying to an aesthetic appreciation of the places (in French for example: Bellevue, Mirabeau, Beauvoir etc.);
2. a literature (oral or written) singing the beauty of the place;
3. ornamental gardens;
4. architecture designed to enjoy a beautiful view;
5. paintings representing the environment;
6. one or more words to say "landscape";
7. an explicit reflection on "the landscape".

The criterion that I adopted last (here n° 4) was after the reading of Javier Maderuelo (Maderuelo, 2005), which was particularly attached to the architectural side of the thing; but the works of Toriumi Motoki on the appearance of the balcony in Paris, in the Renaissance, has already put the flea in my ear (Toriumi, 2001).

The Roman world (the *cosmophany* of the Roman realities), for example, meets the criteria 1, 2, 3 and 5, but not the criteria 4 (even in superb sites, the architecture is turned towards the atrium), 6 and 7. Various authors, like Agamben, are of the opinion that the Romans met criterion 6, but for me this judgment is abusive. The *topia* or *topia opera*, these "topiary

works" that are discussed in Vitruvius (*De Architectura*, V, 5, 2), are pictorial motifs, derived from the art of gardens. The *Gaffiot* translates *topia* as "landscapes with fresco" (it is a plural, the singular is not attested, and this is not trivial: there is no concept behind these figures). Now the Latin language has never brought these motifs closer to *amoenia* (or *amoeni loci*, *loca amoena*, *amoenitas locorum*, expressions that apply to the charms of the environment) to integrate them into a real notion of landscape. Still, what does this dissociation mean? Similarly, such a famous expression of a letter from Pliny the Younger (*Epistulae*, V, 6, 7), *regionis forma pulcherrima*, can only be translated as "the country is superb", but not "the landscape is very beautiful" (at least, we cannot put that in the mind of Pliny). Respect the Romans and the Latin language, what the hell! They undoubtedly had a landscape sensibility, a landscape thought, but they had no thought of the landscape, starting with a word to say it, and which would have integrated the *topia* of the painting (or gardens) and the *loci* or the *formae* of the environment. Let's be precise: in the Roman world, there was no birth of the landscape. For proof, among others, that it was not until the Renaissance that we invent in Italy gazebo and balconies!

In China, on the other hand, *ting* 亭 (pavilions, kiosks to admire the view) were built since the time of the Spring and Autumn (-770 / -475); and the sinogram 亭 correlatively dates from this period (it includes the element 高, which means "high", i.e. "high point of view"). The birth of the landscape, as far as we can date it on documents, it actually occurred in China. Criterion 7, the most discriminating of all, is completed around 440 with the Introduction to Landscape Painting (*Hua shanshui xu*), by Zong Bing (375-443). Criterion 6 is almost a century earlier:

It was under the reign of an emperor who bore the same name, Mu, as Mu the Son-of-Heaven (Mu Tianzi) - that king who, towards the beginning of the Zhou of the west (-1122 / -770), went to the western countries and was the host of the Queen of Immortals, Xiwangmu, in whom one could see an eastern figure of Mesopotamian Ishtar and Carthaginian Tanit, goddess of birth and fertility (Masako, 2005). For my part, I would bring her closer to the dark female, Xuanpin, of which Laozi speaks:

谷神不死 *Gu shen bu si* if The genie of the valley does not die
 是謂玄牝 *Shi Wei Xuanpin* She's called the Darkgirl
 玄牝之門 *Xuanpin zhi men* The door of the Dark female
 是謂天地根 *Shi wei tian di gen* Called the root of heaven and earth
 綿綿若存 *Mianmian ruo cun* Like a thread she lasts
 用之不勤 *Yong zhi bu jin* To use it does not exhaust it (Rôshi, 1973, 16).

Thus, under the eastern Jin, on the third day of the third lunar month of Yonghe IX (353), Wang Xizhi, the immortal calligrapher (303-361), invited some forty friends to his villa, the Pavilion. orchids (Lanting, now in the suburb of Shaoxing, Zhejiang). As was customary in the good society of that time (use inaugurated six centuries ago by King Zhao of Qin), it was for a banquet of *liu shang shui*: gathered for a country picnic in the vast garden of the villa, which meanders (that *shui*) of a creek landscaped, the guests had to compose a couplet before they reached a cup of wine (*shang*) drifting (*liu*)

over the water; only then could they drink it.

In many of the poems collected on this occasion, the word *shanshui* is undoubtedly used in the sense of "landscape". For example, from Wang Huizhi³ (Akinobu & Hakime, 2000, 81):
 Hu 懷 山水 *San huai shanshui* distracting my heart from the landscape

蕭然忘羈 *Xiaoran wang ji* To myself absent, I forget my halter or from Sun Tong:

地主觀山水 *Dizhu guan shanshui* The master of the house scrutinizes the landscape

尋幽人踪 *Yang xun you ren zong* To the heights seeking traces of anchorites

where it is also clear that the landscape does not belong to the ordinary worldly dimension, this "halter" of which the first couplet speaks⁴. Indeed, to be born, the landscape required that a certain fraction of society, playing the anchorites, be distinguished from the world⁵ (Berque, 2010/ 2016).

From the mountain waters to the "landscape"

This word, which for the first time in history, unquestionably means "landscape," *shanshui*, is composed of the two elements *shan*, mountain, and *shui*, water, river. It goes without saying that both are much older than their *shanshui* compound. For a very long time, *shan* and *shui* appear separately⁶ (Barraqué, 2010). This is the case in a famous passage Confucius Interviews (-551 / -479) where it is said that "The wise savors the river, the benevolent delights the mountain"⁷ (*Zhizhe shui, renzhe shan* 知者樂水, 仁者樂山). Experts agree that this is not a landscape. For Yolaine Escande, who translates "The benevolent man takes pleasure in the mountain (*shan*), the wise man takes pleasure in the water (*shui*)" (Escande, 2005, 37), "what matters is not the *shan* and the *shui* as that such, but kindness and wisdom, of which mountain and water are metaphors (*ibid*)". According to Donald Holzman, who refers to the phrase "Those who are intelligent love water," the glosses here are most often "water for the symbol of ceaseless activity, the mountains, for stability" (Holzman, 1996, 28). solidity". Katô Bin makes the following comment: "The gloss holds that the sage sees in the incessant changes of running water the free configuration of the knowledge which is manifested, while the benevolent sees in the aspect of the mountain, whose stability shelters a thousand things, the appearance of benevolence; always is that *shan* and *shui* are there already considered in their contrast⁸. It is this contrastive relationship of *Shan* and *Shui* that orders Kato's intention. He analyzes various occurrences at the time of the Warring States (-475 / -221). Those where *shan* and *shui* are joined together in a single word can be counted on the fingers of the hand. One of the most significant is found in Mozi (or Mo Di, c.-468 / c.-376): "There are geniuses of the sky, as there are spirits and spirits of the mountains and waters (*shanshui guishen* 山水鬼神)⁹". Kato judges that here the word *Shanshui* means on one side the mountains, on the other the waters in the double sense of rivers and lakes. However, since the text in question employs eight times the phrase *shanshui guishen*, it undoubtedly forms a semantic unit, where the determinant is *shanshui*, the *guishen* determinate. So the question is about the different categories of geniuses,

rather than the environment. It is not considered for itself (let alone as a landscape), but as the home of these geniuses.

But the geniuses in question are hardly hospitable. The expression that traditionally refers to them in the Chinese language, chimei wangliang 魑魅魍魎¹⁰, ended up taking the figurative meaning of "evil, evil man". The chimei, which haunt mountains, forests and swamps, are quadrupeds with human faces, which torment people. The chi looks like a tiger and loves the mountains, the mei likes the vale and looks like a boar. As for the wangliang, who can appear in the guise of a three-year-old with long ears and red eyes, they deceive humans by imitating their voices, and their habitat is all wild places, waters, rocks or trees.

These remarks¹¹ join a classic study by Paul Demiéville, "The mountain in Chinese literary art"¹² (Demiéville, 1973), whose general meaning is that, until the great reversal of which we will speak later on, the mountain, its forests and its torrents were the the domain of fear, of a more intense fear than that which appears in Greco-Roman mythology. We do not imagine the nymph Echo as a wangliang, and yet she is the strict counterpart ...

Still, for a long time yet, shan and shui usually meet as separate words, whatever their semantic relationship: "as to whether it favored their composition in a word such as shanshui, the fact is that, rather than shanshui, it is shanchuan - which is commonly used¹³. Indeed, until Qin (-221 / -207), shanshui is very rare. Analyzing its occurrences, Katô judges that the word then means "the waters of the mountain (yama no mizu 山の水), meaning that will subsequently remain in the semantic heart of the shanshui¹⁴".

Under the Han (-206/220), the Three Kingdoms (220/265) and until the beginning of the Six Dynasties (265-581), shanshui remains of infrequent use, and in most cases it has this meaning: "The waters of the mountain". Katô also remarks that he is not used in poetry, proof that he has no aesthetic connotation. It is usually in the vocabulary of engineers that we meet, area where it clearly refers to torrents, from the mountain, which is to temper the violence or use water for irrigation.

In poetry, the first occurrence of shanshui is due to Zuo Si (v. 250 - v. 305), who lived under the western Jin¹⁵. The word is in the first of his two poems of the invitation made to the hermit (Zhao yinzhe er shou 招隱者二首). Such a theme is classic in Chinese poetry: a Mandarin, who has chosen to retreat far from the city and power, is urged by him to return, for his great virtues are necessary to the kingdom. This is for Zuo Si the opportunity to describe the place of this retreat in the wilderness. There are these two verses:

非必糸与竹 *Fei bi si yu zhu* No need for yarn or bamboo¹⁶
山水有清音 *Shanshui you qing yin* The waters of the mountain have a pure sound

where, obviously, shanshui designates a mountain torrent, but where also, no less obviously, this word is charged with a positive aesthetic value, as is the whole environment described by the rest of the poem.

This is a revolution from the terrors traditionally inspired by the mountainous terrain. We are here, however, still in a transitional stage, where enjoyment of the mountain landscape

there is, but not yet a word to say such a thing. The two poems in question had great success, especially the two verses above. In those times when the poems really sang, every literary lip hummed them. In the next few decades, shanshui will crystallize this favor, a process by which the word acquires a new meaning - that of landscape:

To have been used in this poem, Shanshui will gradually take on a meaning expressing aesthetically the sensitive¹⁷ scene of nature, composed of mountains and rivers, and imprint of purity¹⁸.

This is undoubtedly done in 353, at the famous banquet of the Orchid Pavilion.

A cosmophany for happy few

Xie Lingyun (385-433), the first "landscape poet" (shanshui shiren 山水詩人)¹⁹, was said to be "lonely"²⁰, although he was actually very plural in his excursions by mountains and valleys. Because, for him, the footwork of his servants did not count; she was outlawed, locked out with her very real job:

"From his father, Xie Lingyun inherited many activities²¹. Besides a crowd of serfs²², he had several hundred clients²³. Clearing the mountains, dredging the ponds, he did not stop his work²⁴. Exploring the mountains and climbing the peaks, he pushed up to the steep recesses. He had not ceased that he had climbed a thousand walls, scaled in detail. Often wearing galoshes²⁵, he removed the front teeth on the ascent, those of the heel on the descent. He opened a path through the woods at the peak of the South of Shining to reach Linhai directly. He had [that day] a sequel of several hundred people. The governor of Linhai, Wan Xiu, was so seized that he believed in a gang of looters²⁶.

To see the landscape, but not the work that produced it, and to think of itself alone in front of nature: I call this the principle of Xie Lingyun. This principle was promised a bright future: it is still in the works of Cezanne that we saw above. In a word, although the material forms of the landscape are largely the fruit of peasant work, seeing the environment as landscape is the prerogative of an elite, the happy few who, for this cosmophany - this appearance of their world - have the right taste.

From this elitist taste, Xie Lingyun was conscious, and he knew how to say it. This is what he expresses with the word shang 賞, which he frequently uses. In this sinogram, the key 貝 (originally a pictogram of a shell, which served as currency like the cauri) carries the idea of value; and the upper element, phonetic, that of conferring a price, a praise. It is, therefore, fundamentally about the capacity to appreciate, to confer value on something. Xie Lingyun willingly associates this character with that of the heart (xin 心), in shangxin 賞心, to specifically say "sensitivity to the landscape", or more generally "aesthetic sense". This is a very fengliu 風流 (distinguished) feeling, which, because of his loneliness, he often regrets not being able to share with a national a happy few like himself, who 我志誰与亮 *Wo zhi shei yu liang* With me would see clearly where I aspire
賞心惟良知²⁷ *Shangxin wei liang zhi* And only one would like to recognize him well

The essential thing in this "taste" (shangxin) is, well, this abil-

ity to give a price to what, for the vulgar, does not have, because it does not have the eyes to see it. as appropriate; that is, in this case, as a landscape. Just like, according to Cezanne, the peasants of his time do not have the eyes that it takes to appreciate the Sainte-Victoire as such. And it is while reflecting on this strange phenomenon that Xie Linyun wrote these verses, which I consider as the birth certificate of the landscape:

Qing 用 賞 為 美 *Qing yong shang wei mei* Feeling, by taste, makes beauty

事 味 竟 誰 辨 *Shi mei jing shei bian* Dark thing before we say it

觀 此 遺 物 慮 *Guan ci yi wu lü* Forgetting to his sight the worldly worries

一 所 所 遣 *Yi⁸ wu de suo qian* Having seized it, we can indulge in it

These are the last verses of a long poem, *By Peaks and Values* from Jinzhujian. Jinzhujian (Jin Zhu Gave) is near Shaoxing, in the Guiji Mountains, where Xie Linyun retired to his luxurious Shining Villa. He wrote many poems about the landscapes of this region of Zhejiang (where the Orchid Pavilion was also located), which is indeed famous for its natural beauties. This poem begins by describing the scenes traversed by our Wanderer, by lending them as appropriate allusions to older poems, and ends with the four aforementioned verses. "Birth certificate", the word is heavy. Is it justified? Xie Linyun, though unanimously recognized as the first landscape poet, is not the first to use the word *shanshui* in the sense of "landscape". Although he has written a lot of landscape poems, he is also not the first poet to have sung landscapes. What is radically new and profoundly modern is that he has sensed the essence of what constitutes a landscape as such; and it is especially these four verses who say it. They are therefore truly founders, knowingly.

From the principle of Xie Linyun to the trajectory

For my part, I readily read in these four towards the presentiment of the trajectory²⁹ (Berque, 1986/ 2000) of the landscape. This one is not "beautiful" in itself. To "make it beautiful" (*wei mei 為 美*), it is necessary that a spectator participates, and that it has the "taste" (*shang*) which is appropriate; because in such a disposition, he will have the emotion or the feeling (*qing 情*) proper to the appreciation from which the beauty will be born (towards 1). It is obscure, sooty (*mei 味*), elusive as long as words do not establish it as such; it is necessary that "some judge and say it" (*shei bian 誰 辨*, towards 2). From there, a dimension is created inaccessible to the worldliness of the "material worries" (*wu lü 物 慮*, towards 3); and from now on, the landscape offers to the sensibility of the amateur of the catches which reassures him, he can deliver his heart there (*suo qian 所 遣*, towards 4).

Suffice to say that this privileged spectator has been able to grasp the environment (the subject S, what it is about) as a landscape (the predicate P, as far as it is grasped), and that henceforth it has access to a certain reality (S / P: S as P) that ordinary people can not recognize. The central mechanism

of this trauma, creating a new world, is good: to confer price. It is the establishment of a new added value, the work of an existential operator (the as-that) that outclasses previous ones; which are suddenly foreclosed by this new predicate P', which is invested with the authority of an elite. Xie Linyun is the first to have had it except consciousness, at least prescience; and this is precisely the second aspect of Xie Linyun's principle: its instituting aspect, not only forcing. The *shang*, adding value to the Earth (S) by a new predicate (P')³⁰, is indeed the land operation of the deployment of the *ecumene* (S / P) - the home of our being.

To exist as something

The abode of our being on the planet Earth, the *ecumene*, is obviously not born of the only word of the poets; it is an immense and collective work, which life began on Sol III 3.8 billion years ago; but to say it truly as such, it took the symbolic systems of *Homo sapiens*, and especially the speech that only human language allows, with its double articulation. Speech is not the essence of this trauma, but it is the paradigm. Why? Because only speech has made it possible to represent things in complete independence from their physical presence, wherever they are and at all times. We could here and now, at the Mariani campus, talk about what is happening in Australia, or discuss the Big Bang. In other words, we can freely make ek-sister things out of the *gangué* their in-themselves (S), to represent them (P), where and when we want, as something (S / P).

This principle of "something as something" (*etwas als etwas*), Heidegger brought to light about *Uexküll* in his seminary from 1929-1930, whose text was taken up after his death under the title *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik)*³¹. It is true that, by a subtle shift, there is talk of *Grundstimmung* rather than *Ton* and *Tönung* as in *Uexküll*³² (*Von Uexküll, 1934*); subtlety which nevertheless escapes the French translations, where we speak in both cases of "tonality" (here "fundamental"). The idea remains the same, except that Heidegger specifies things. For example, the *Uexküllian* demonstration that

"The whole richness of the world around the tick (*die Zecke umgebende Welt*) shrinks (*schnurrt zusammen*) and turns into a poor shaping (*ein ärmliches Gebilde*), composed essentially of only three sensible signs (*Merkmale*) and three Agile signs (*Wirkmalen*): it is its environment (*ihre Umwelt*). The poverty (*Ärmlichkeit*) of the environment, however, conditions the certainty of activity, and certainty is more important than wealth³³»

unfolds in Heidegger's famous thesis that the stone is "without world" (*weltlos*), the animal "poor in world" (*weltarm*), and the man "trainer of world" (*weltbildend*)³⁴. It should not be forgotten that, in *Uexküll*, talking about the "poverty" of the tick world is contradictory, because it is only in relation to the raw environmental data, the *Umgebung* (ie the *Umwelt* of our science), that this world can be considered poor and reduced to a mere image. From the point of view of the

tick, however, his Umwelt is just as complete and real as Plato, from his human point of view, has judged him from kosmos (that is to say from his Umwelt) in the last lines of Timaeus³⁵. Heidegger, from a purely anthropocentric (and more precisely logocentric) point of view, will see "poverty in the world as deprivation of the world" (Weltarmut als Entbehren von Welt)³⁶.

Where Heidegger breaks new ground is a logical and ontological consideration. Commenting on Aristotle's enunciative proposition, he shows that this one, in speaking of $\sigma\upsilon\nu\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$,

"(...) means what we call the structure of" as "(die 'als'-Struktur). This is what he means, without really going forward explicitly in the dimension of this problem. The structure of "as," the unifying forward perception (vorgängige einheitbildende Vernehmen) of something as something (etwas als etwas), is the condition of possibility of the truth or falsity of $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ³⁷.

This "perception by unifying advance", Heidegger likens³⁸ it to the preaching of a as b, which makes "a is b". This is the "structural moment of evidence" (Strukturmoment der Offenbarkeit) by which things appear as something. It is the in-of-being of being as such (das Seiende als solches), in short, the qua of ensa, the $\tilde{\eta}$ of $\delta\tilde{\nu}$ $\tilde{\eta}$ $\delta\tilde{\nu}$.

In Heidegger's statement, "this' as very elementary is (...) what is denied to the animal"³⁹. This statement is clearly logocentric, and it is there that it will diverge from that of Uexküll. Indeed, for Heidegger, while being admitted that a lizard is not a simple matter, unlike the rock on which it is heated in the sun, "When we say that the lizard is lying on the rock, we should strike out the word 'rock', to indicate that what it lies on is certainly known in some way, but not as a rock (nicht als Felsplatte). The redaction does not only mean: something else and grasped as something else, but still quite inaccessible as being (überhaupt nicht als Seiendes zugänglich)"⁴⁰.

Thus the animal is "foreclosed of the evidence of the being" (ausgeschlossen aus der Offenbarkeit vom Seiendem)⁴¹, which is inseparable from the human saying and acting, which mediate specifically the environmental data (we will remember here the possibility of Vidal de la Blache, even Augustinian free will). The animal, for its part, is unable to distance itself from its environment, because it is "imprisoned" (benommen) in the same hold that it has on it, and thus, its behavior (benehmen) is impulsively dictated to it by his middle⁴².

In the lack of recoil of this "hold" (Benommenheit), there can be no proper opening of the world; there is only what Heidegger calls "being-open-minded" (das Offensein in der Benommenheit). To return to Uexküll, this corresponds to what he calls Umwelt (middle), and that Heidegger is keen to distinguish from Welt, the world proper, which, in short, can not really open up, so being it does not to be as such, only through the grace of the symbolic systems (to say it) and the technical systems (the act) proper to humanity.

The Grundbegriffe thus arrive at the thesis - very similar to the emergence of the ecumene from the biosphere - of "the formation of the world as what happens fundamentally in

Dasein" (Weltbildung als Grundgeschehen im Dasein). and "essence as a reign of the world" (das Wesen als das Walten der Welt).

In the vocabulary of mesology - the study of environments, and especially the ecumene, all human environments -, this means that in what is for us reality ($r = S / P$), the essence of things are dictated to us by the predicate, in other words by the manner in which we have to seize S - the gross given of the environment, ie the in-itself of the terrestrial Umgebung. It is now time to come more directly to the theme of this workshop: "from art to public space".

From the ecumenal to the Ursprung of the work of art

If, in what has been translated into French as "the Origin of the Work of Art" (der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes)⁴³ (Brokmeier, 1962), the famous text of Heidegger, "origin" translates Ursprung, French evokes not the image expressed here in German; namely the sprung (Sprung) first (ur) of something that will exist - ek-sister gushing-out of something else. To go directly to the conclusion that I would like here to draw from the bridge of mesological view, it is the birth of the reality (S / P) from the Earth (S), by the effect of the en-as -worldly (P) implemented by art. It is the Earth seized as a world, and the work of art is in this existential operator: the en-ecouménéal.

Is that what Heidegger means? Certainly, the wanted obscurity of its text would allow to discuss it without end, but what we have just seen obliges nevertheless to frame the thing in a certain sense. The author who expresses himself in The Origin of the Work of Art is no other man than the one who, five years ago, wrote the Grundbegriffe⁴⁴ (Heidegger, 1954), and he did not come out, as by mutation, of the Grundstimmung that he professes there; he did not change soil (Grund). Moreover, this is not just a question of presumption, and it is not the only Heidegger. So when this one writes the hieratic lines "Standing on the rock, the work of the temple opens a world and, in return, establishes it on the Earth, which then only appears as the native soil (heimatlicher Grund). For never are men and animals, men and things given and known as invariable objects (...). It is the temple which, by its authority (Dastehen), gives things their face, and men the view of themselves"⁴⁵ (Heidegger, 1962).

it must be remembered that before him Uexküll had already shown that "an animal cannot come into contact with an object as such"⁴⁶, because it is not with the abstract objects of the Umgebung that it is in relation but with the concrete things of his own Umwelt.

But these things are "concrete" by their growth-together - their cum-crescere, whence concretus - with what Plato would have called the genesis of the animal itself in the sensible world. to say, in this case, in that medium. In the concrete reality of the Umwelt (ie $r = S / P$), indeed, beings and things go together, because the life of beings grasps things as something that is in a pathological adequacy with their being. even, so their own self-grasping.

Admittedly, this is not the vocabulary of Uexküll, but it is

what he shows by speaking of "counterpoint as a motive for morphogenesis" (Kontrapunkt als Motiv der Formbildung)⁴⁷ in the living world, and when pose that

"The fundamental technical rule which is expressed in the flower (*Blumenhaftigkeit*)⁴⁸ of the bee and in the apicity (*Bi- enenhaftigkeit*) of the flower, we can apply it to the other examples cited. Surely, the spider web conforms fly-ly⁴⁹, because the spider itself is fly-ly. Being fly-ly means that the spider, in its constitution, has incorporated certain elements of the fly. Not from a determined fly, but from the archetype (*Urbild*) of the fly. Better said, the fly-ly-arity of the spider means that it has incorporated into its body composition, some patterns of the fly-ly melody (*Fliegenmelodie*)⁵⁰.

It is because, for Uexküll, the "technique of nature" (*die Naturtechnik*) functions as a symphony, the various elements of which are in "contrapuntal relations" (*kontrapunktischen Beziehungen*)⁵¹. By forming, everyone forms others. That is to say that the one from which a medium emerges, from the environment, modifies the environment itself. In short, it has a function that is not only cosmogenetic, but ontogenetic.

But in a human world, it is the human work that performs this function, but especially by the technique and the symbol, to act and to say it. So in this case, in the example chosen by Heidegger, the temple makes the surrounding things exist as what they are:

"On the rock, the temple rests its constancy. This 'rest on' brings out the dark of its raw support and yet it is there for nothing. In its constancy, the built work stands up to the storm passing over it, thus demonstrating the storm itself in all its violence. The brilliancy and the light of its stone, which seems to be due only to the grace of the sun, bring out the brightness of the day, the immensity of the sky, the darkness of the night."⁵²

And what does this mysterious "who is not here for nothing" mean⁵³? It becomes clear if we remember that Uexküll showed that what in the *Umgebung* does not belong to the Umwelt of a certain animal, does not exist for this one. For the animal, what exists is only what enters the "functional circle" (*Funktionskreis*) between its "agile world" (*Wirkwelt*) and its "sensible world" (*Merkwelt*)⁵⁴; because "as many performances (*Leistungen*) an animal is able to perform, so many objects (*Gegenstände*) he is able to distinguish in his environment"⁵⁵; but as for the rest of the environmental data, he does not care, and it's literally there for nothing. Just like, once, oil for the Inuit, who had yet under their feet for millennia.

This raw support that is there for nothing - that which, in the *Umgebung*, is not discovered, open as something - is the lying below (*hupokeimenon*) which remains conflat in its in-itself of subject (S), identical to oneself and inaccessible as long as it is not *trajected*, predicated as a certain world (P). But even what, as a certain predicate (P), is discovered and becomes reality (S / P), does not cease to exist in itself (S). This raw material which both gives itself as a world (P) and withdraws itself (S), in other words

"This verse where the work retreats, and what it brings out by

this withdrawal, we have called the Earth. It is what, emerging, resumes within it (*das Hervorkommend-Bergende*). The Earth is the tireless and tireless influx of what is there for nothing. On Earth and in her, the historical man bases his stay in the world. Setting up a world, the work brings the Earth (*Indem das Werk eine Welt aufstellt, stellt es die Erde her*). This coming-come must be thought in a rigorous sense. *The work carries and keeps the Earth itself in the open of a world. The work frees the Earth to be a land*⁵⁶.

What, then, is the existential operator "as-what" (i.e. the work) liberating the Earth? From the straitjacket of his identity of S, to make it the reality of a true land (S / P), that is to say to bring it (the pro-duire: herstellen) as a certain world (P). Heidegger certainly says that "this coming-come must be thought in a rigorous sense" (Herstellen ist yesterday im strengen Sinne of the Worts zu denken), but he would have failed in his fate as "mage of the Black Forest"⁵⁷ if he had clarified the said meaning by bringing it closer to the language of which the Grundbegriffe had formerly spoken explicitly; namely, the assumption of S as P, which produces (stellt her) the reality S / P.

What is explicit, however, is that for Heidegger, this assumption is the unstitching (ἀ-λήθεια) of truth (ἀλήθεια), from the darkness of its raw support (the Earth). This operation is the one where S, discovered and deployed as P, becomes S / P, that is, reality; but it is not simple because

"Being uncovered of being is never a state that is already there, but always an advent. To be discovered (truth) is as little a quality of things - in the sense of being - as it is a quality of statements. (...) It belongs to the essence of the truth to be uncovered to suspend itself in the mode of the double reserve. Truth is, in essence, untruth"⁵⁸.

That the truth would be untruth is remarkably Zen; but it is clear that, insofar as it is the in-of-the-ἡ-λήθεια, the truth is neither the in-itself of S, nor the for-itself of P (that in as long as S exists - ek-sist, ur-springt [premium-springs] - in the eyes of a certain being). "In the double-reserve mode" (in der Weise des zwiefachen Verbergens)⁵⁹, it is neither one nor the other, nor S nor P but, between the two, S as P - and thus falls of a meso-logic that is neither the logic of the identity of the subject (that of Aristotle, who founded scientific rationalism on the absolutization of S)⁶⁰, nor the logic of the identity of the predicate (that of Nishida, jutsugo no ronri 述語の論理, who is of religious essence by his absolutization of P)⁶¹. In other words, it happens precisely in the "dispute" (Streit) between the Earth (S) and the world (P).

So, would the truth in question be art rather than science? This is what Heidegger tells us, for whom

"The institution of truth in the work is the production of a being that was not before, and will never happen afterwards. (...) The truth is instituted in the work. The truth unfolds its being only as a fight between thinning and reserve, in the adversity of the world and the Earth"⁶²,

while

"Science, on the contrary, is not an inaugural advent of the

truth, but always the exploitation of a region of truth already open⁶³,

which leads Heidegger to this conclusion:

"The essence of art is Poem. The essence of Poem is the establishment of truth⁶⁴.

From the mesological point of view, the assumption of S as P is the reality ($r = S / P$) rather than the truth, which in principle is the adequacy of P to S. This, at least it is the truth in the sense of science - but this sense is ideal and abstract, for the very fact of reaching S is to predict it as P; in other words, concretely, make it exist as something, so, in fact, discover a new reality (S / P)⁶⁵. At the end of the day, the two truths would come together half-way in the opposite direction; because, while the poem (art) frees the Earth from its own identity to open it to new worlds, science dissects the world to find the Earth. And so comes, in a litigation indefinitely renewed, in our obore or rather spiral, moving and always new, the reality of human environments. This is indeed only the truth, which, concretely if not in the abstract, is neither S nor P, but S as P -: the ordering (kosmos) of the Earth as a certain world (kos-

mos). In short, the cosmophany of the Earth, in this trajectory by the senses, the action, thought and speech that is the human work, and paradigmatically this existential operator that is the work of art.

In their ontological principle, such is the unveiling, such is the cosmophany of the geographical realities, which according to the cases we are common, private or public; and, moreover, it is basically what a physicist like Bernard d'Espagnat shows when he speaks of "real veiled" - a quasi-Heideggerian expression, and in any case mesological, since the "real" is S, which is always "veiled" as P when it becomes reality (S / P); except that the approach of science is the opposite of that of art, since where Heidegger speaks of unveiling ($\alpha\text{-}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$), Espagnat speaks of veiling!

The existential operator "as a landscape", meanwhile, has today extended its grip to the majority of human environments. It covers so many things, it concerns so many people, that the "litigations" it can provoke, from ontology to urbanism, certainly have a bright future. No offense to Xie Lingyun, we are no longer alone in front of the landscape!

Endnote

1. The reference to Fehling is the following : Detlev FEHLING, *Ethologische Überlegungen auf dem Gebiet der Altertumskunde. Phalliche Demonstration, Fernsicht, Steinigung* (Ethological reflections on the field of ancient art. Phallic demonstration, far away, stoning), Munich, C.H. Beck, 1974.
2. In what follows, I resume without major modifications a passage of my *La Pensée paysagère* [Landscape thoughts], Bastia, éditions Éoliennes, 2017 (2008), p. 49 sqq.
3. I extract the couplets that follow from GOTÔ Akinobu and MATSUMOTO Hajime (dir.), *Shigo no imêji. Tôshi o yomu tame ni* (Images of the poetic vocabulary. To read Tang poetry), Tokyo, Tôkyô shoten, 2000, p. 81 (KATÔ Bin's contribution, p. 75-93, who quotes these articles, is devoted to the origin of the term shanshui).
4. Wz may also think, more prosaically, that the person concerned forgets to harness his horse; but a Mandarin normally leaves such things to the grooms.
5. On this theme, see my *Histoire de l'habitat idéal, d'Orient en Occident* [History of the ideal habitat, from East to West], Paris, Le Félin, 2016 (2010).
6. I repeat below without major changes a passage from my article "Des eaux de la montagne au paysage [From the mountains to the landscape]" published in Bernard BARRAQUÉ et Pierre-Alain ROCHE (dir.), *Peurs et plaisirs de l'eau* [Fears and pleasures of water], Paris, Hermann, 2010, p. 245-260.
7. Translation given by le Grand Ricci, *dictionnaire de la langue chinoise* [the Grand Ricci, dictionary of the Chinese language], vol. I, at the entrance 知者樂水、仁者樂山 (chih che le shui, jen che le shan), and followed by this comment: "the sage is recognized in the water that is diffused and the benevolent in the mountain that is erected: the sage loves the movement and the benevolent tranquility." Just before, at the entrance to Shih Chui, the same Ricci gives: "The wise man finds his pleasure in looking at water: the wise man likes to apprehend the things of life such as water flowing without restraint".
8. Art. cit. in GOTÔ, p. 76.
9. Cited by Katô, p. 77.
10. According to the Ricci : "Genies of mountains, forests (or marshes) and waters: evil spirits, evil spirits".
11. That I extract from various dictionnaires (the Ricci, the Kôjien et the Daijigen). In Japanese, chimei wangliang is read chimi môryô.
12. Initialu published in France-Asie, CLXXXIII (1965), p. 7-32, and taken back in Paul DEMIÉVILLE, *Choix d'études sinologiques* [A choice in Sinologic studies] (1921-1970), Leiden, Brill, 1973, p. 390-406.
13. Katô, op. cit. p. 77.
14. Ibid.
15. This dynasty, which united the empire in 265, was forced to flee in 317 to the south of the Blue River, driven out of the North by the Barbarians. It establishes its new capital in Jiankang (Nanjing), which is further east than Luoyang, the former capital. We can distinguish the Jin from the West (265/316) from the Eastern Jin (317/420).
16. Meaning of musical instruments, of which these are the materials. The poem is reproduced by Katô p. 79 sq.
17. In Japanese, jôkei 情景, that the Kenkyûsha makes it so : « 1. a scene, a sight. 2. nature and sentiment ». It's the Chinese qingjing, that the Ricci translates by : "1. state of affairs, situation, circumstances. 2. impression, disposition, state of mind". Escande (op.cit., 161) defines this term as the "emotional dimension" of the landscape. I chose "sensible sceneries", jing (visible scene, sceneries) being in this word determined by qing, "feeling, emotion". It is as much a state of mind as an environment.
18. Katô, p. 81.
19. In what follows, I resume without great modifications, a passage from my *Histoire de l'habitat idéal* [History of the Ideal habitat], op. cit., p. 72 sq.
20. Witness the title of the book OBI Kôichi, *Sha Reibun, Kodoku no Sansui Shijin* (Xie Lingyun, the solitary poet of the landscape), Tokyo, Kyûko shoin, 1983, from which I draw the following data.
21. From a field originally of 3,000 tenures, it was downgraded to 500.
22. Nutong 奴僮.
23. Yigumen 義故門.
24. Gongyi 功役.
25. Muli 木履.
26. I translate based on Xie Lingyun's bibliography, cited by Obi, op. cit., p. 202.
27. Cited by Obi, op. cit. p. 254.
28. Cited by Obi, op. cit. p. 179.

29. This notion has been introduced and illustrated in my book *Le Sauvage et l'artifice. The Japanese in front of nature*, Paris, Gallimard, 1986. I particularly theorized in *Écoumène. Introduction à l'étude des milieux humains* [Ecumene. Introduction to the study of human environments], Paris, Belin, 2000. I define it as follows, with its correlates, in *Glossaire de mesologie* (Bastia, Éoliennes editions, 2018, asterisks refer to other entries of the same glossary):

To TRAJECT v. Accomplish a trajectory. Syn. of ek-sister * and to exist *: the tuft of grass S * trajects as feed P * for the cow I *. Cezanne traps Sainte-Victoire as a "landscape", but not the hicks of the region, which according to him "have never seen it", i. e. never seen as a landscape, unlike the happy few of which he is a part, him (and us after him, as a trajectorious chain *). TRAJECTIF adj. Speaking of trajectory: a thing * is not only objective, only subjective, not only substantial, nor merely relational, it is trajectory.

TRAJECTIVELY adv. By a trajectory way; in trajectory chain.

TRAJECTION n. 1. The comings and goings of reality * between the two theoretical poles of the subjective and the objective: reality does not concern only the object * or the subject alone *; falling under the trajectory of the two, she is trajectory. 2. Assumption of S * as * P *, syn. ek-sistence *: In the fourth century, in China, there was a flood of mountain waters (shan shui 山水) as a landscape (shanshui 山水).

TRAJECTIVITY n. 1. Syn. * existence. State of beings * and things * which ek-sist * in a * concrete * medium, correlative to their mediance * and resulting from a quasi-infinity of trajectory chains *. 2. Syn. mouvance*: the "tension-to" (that) of the principle of Zong Bing * expresses the feeling of the trajectory of things.

30. This is what I call "trajectory chain", which the Glossary of mesology gives the following definition:

TRAJECTIVE CHAIN n. Continuation of trajectories, hypostasizing (substantializing) progressively S / P * (thus hypostasizing of the same movement P) in S', S' / P' in S'', S'' / P'' in S''', and so right now. Is represented by the formula $((S/P) / S') / S'' / S''' \dots$ etc. : The trajectory chains are analogous to the semiological chains in Barthes and the semiosis in Peirce.

31. Francfort-sur-le-Main, Klostermann, 1983. French translation by Daniel Panis, Paris, Gallimard, 1993. For what follows, I resume without large modifications of large passages of my article Published in the *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. LX, n° 171, déc. 2016, p. 1-14.

32. V. Jakob von UEXKÜLL, *Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen* (Incursions into animal and human environments), Hambourg, Rowohlt, 1956 (1934). There are two French translations: by Philippe Müller, *Animal worlds and the human world*, Paris, Denoël, 1965; and by Charles Martin-Fréville, *Animal and Human Environment*, Paris, Payot & Rivages, 2010.

33. *Streifzüge...*, op. cit. p. 29. Trad. A.B.

34. *Die Grundbegriffe...*, § 42.

35. Where it says that the kosmos is "very big, very good, very beautiful and very finished" (megistos kai aristos kallistos te kai teléotatos).

36. *Die Grundbegriffe...*, § 46.

37. *Die Grundbegriffe...*, p. 456. Italics by Heidegger. Trad. A.B.

38. I pick up here the purpose from § 69.

39. Op. cit., p. 416.

40. Op. cit., p. 291-292.

41. Op. cit., p. 358.

42. Heidegger plays here (op. cit., § 46) on the relationship between benommen ("stunned, obnubile," but also past participle of benehmen) and benehmen ("behavior", but also "remove, deprive of"), both derivatives of nehmen (take) with the particle be, which transitive to make this or that. In short, the animal is "imprisoned" in its environment.

43. Text originally written in 1935, and slightly reworked later. I refer here to the French translation by Wolfgang Brokmeier, published in the French edition of *Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part* [Paths which lead nowhere] (Holzwege, 1949), Paris, Gallimard, 1962, p. 13-98, which is translated Streit by "combat" and not by "litigation". For the original text, I refer to the Gesamtausgabe, V: Holzwege, Frankfurt-am-Main, Vittorio

Klostermann, 1977.

44. A quarter of a century later, Heidegger will take up the same fundamental theses in *Was heisst denken?* (What do we call thinking?), Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1954.

45. Martin HEIDEGGER, *Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part* [Paths which lead nowhere], Paris, Gallimard, 1962 (Holzwege, 1949), p. 45. Translated by Wolfgang Brokmeier.

46. P. 94 in Müller's translation des *Streifzüge*, cited below.

47. *Streifzüge...*, op. cit., p. 145.

48. Müller (*Animal worlds...*, op. cit., p. 152) translates this neologism by "The fact that the flower is 'for the bee'", and adds this note: "German here constructs an adjective, 'bienenhaf', applying to the flower a quality of bee, and to the bee a quality floral. In what follows, we will have in each example a similar verbal process. We made it in French by the turn 'for ...' (...)". I preferred to make it by a homologous neologism (apis = bee in Latin, as further musca = fly [mouche in french]).

49. Depending on the flies [mooches].

50. *Streifzüge...*, op. cit., p. 145. Trad. A.B.

51. *Streifzüge...*, op. cit., p. 142.

52. *Paths...*, op. cit., p. 44.

53. This translation from Brokmeier is excellent, but not enough agile. The German text says here: doch zu nichts gedrängten, ot « yet forced to nothing ». In geographical terms, this means that this land is untapped, left to itself, fallow.

54. See fig. 3 in *Streifzüge...*, op. cit., p. 27.

55. *Streifzüge...*, op. cit., p. 68.

56. *Paths...*, op. cit., p. 49-50. Trans. Brokmeier, only modified by the spelling "Earth" instead of "earth". The German word Erde, as for him, does not make the distinction. NB: the text for the Gesamtausgabe says here, in italics (p. 32) « Das Werk läßt die Erde eine Erde sein », or « The work lets the Earth be an earth », which, unless seen as a mere tautology, implies that the Earth itself aspires to be what human history has done - a fateful vision (to say the least) that I will not discuss here.

57. Expression is from Jean-Claude Beaune.

58. *Paths...*, op. cit., p. 59. Trad. Brokmeier.

59. Gesamtausgabe, op. cit., p. 41. Verbergen, is to hide, to conceal, in sum $\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\nu$...

60. Recall that the subject of the logician is the object of the physicist: what is it, S.

61. On this, see Augustin BERQUE, *La mésologie, pourquoi et pour quoi faire?* [Mesology, why and for what?], Nanterre La Défense, Presses universitaires de Paris Ouest, 2014 ; more specifically « La logique du lieu dépasse-t-elle la modernité ? [Does the logic of the place go beyond modernity?] », p. 41-52, et « Du prédicat sans base : entre mundus et baburu, la modernité [From the baseless preaching: between mundus and baburu, modernity] », p. 53-62 in Livia MONNET (dir.) *Approches critiques de la pensée japonaise au XXe siècle* [Critical Approaches to Japanese Thought in the 20th Century], Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2002. NB : Nishida speaks indifferently of "logic of the predicate" and "logic of the place" (basho no ronri 場所の論理). On the "meso-logic" of the mesology, see my articles « Mesology (風土論) in the light of Yamauchi Tokuryū's Logos and lemma », APF Series 1, *Philosophizing in Asia*, UTCP (The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy), Uehiro Booklet 3, 2013, p. 9-25, and on mesologiques.fr, « La méso-logique des milieux [The meso-logic of places] / 環世界と風土の中論的論理 » (décembre 2013).

62. *Paths...*, op. cit., p. 69 et 70. Trad. Brokmeier, only modified by the spelling "Earth" instead of "earth". NB : Brokmeier translates Streit by «combat», while I return it by «litigation».

63. *Paths...*, op. cit., p. 69. Trad. Brokmeier.

64. Op. cit., p. 84.

65. Bernard d'ESPAGNAT, *À la recherche du réel. Le regard d'un physicien* [In search of the real. The look of a physicist], Paris, Dunod, 2015 (1979); *Le réel voilé : analyse des concepts quantiques* [Veiled reality: analysis of quantum concepts], Paris, Fayard, 1994 ; *Traité de physique et de philosophie* [Treaty of Physics and Philosophy], Paris, Fayard, 2002, 590 p.

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